It is worth to remind that, in Part I of this analysis, two aspects reflecting the managerial problems encountering FC Bayern Munich have been exposed under the following titles: (i) Single decider with outdated mentality; and (ii) Average people in decisive positions.
In this present report, three more related aspects will be detailed before closing this long analysis in the next and last part.
3. Poor medial exposure
One may mention two layers of this issue. The first layer resides in the weak marketing of the entire German Bundesliga (including Bayern obviously) especially in Africa, Asia, Middle East and America compared to the fame of EPL clubs besides Real Madrid and Barcelona. This is due to poor financial situation and absence of investors in the Bundesliga, those are prevented by the 50 +1 outdated rule, extremely supported by Höneß. The second layer of this problematic consists mainly of the statements conflicts given by many responsible members in the club which weakens the image of the club in the eyes of the media itself, the national and international competing clubs and above all in the eyes of the players themselves who would allow themselves to request considerable salaries enhancement and impose their conditions on the club during contract negotiations.
It is worth to mention some controversial situations in the media that do never reflect the traditional robust and consistent famous image of Bayern Munich:
(i) one may not forget the sharp criticisms stated in the media by Uli Höneß in May 2024 against the head coach Thomas Tuchel, one day before the most important game for the team in the season: the 2nd leg of the Champions League semi-final in the Santiago Bernabeu stadium while he could have spared his criticisms till the end of the season.
(ii) the repetitive statements from many responsible that the club is enduring sharp financial crisis and is not able to afford quality players which leads to the degradation of the club’s image and impacts the negotiations with other clubs.
(iii) the contradiction between Eberl’s confirmation through the media about a new contract for Thomas Müller while Höneß was completely refusing to offer him any contract.
(iv) the frequent deadline extensions (many dates specified in May and June 2025) given to Leroy Sane to think again about signing a new contract for the club; Uli Höneß has kept even the deadline open until the end of the mercato through an interview full of rage towards the journalists; in the past Bayern was never extending a deadline to any player.
4. Suspicious sparing policy
At least the only thing to which all members of the club agree is that the club is struggling financially and has to save money and reduce salaries and all football fans are hearing that ‘’song’’ days and nights throughout the media. It is wise to set a sustainable and reliable financial strategy to hold the stability of the club, but this has to be done internally and very far from the media and also on a long term.
First of all, the person who has made a non-reasonable raise in salaries for many players was Hasan Salihamidzic appointed and supported by Höneß himself as sporting manager. Second, this financial save must not affect the technical quality of the squad, in other words this sparing strategy has to be accompanied in parallel by a detailed plan involving list players to be sold and others to be signed such that the wages are reduced and the quality on the pitch remains almost unchanged.
And here a series of questions may be asked. Where was this priority of money saving when the club was ready to pay more than 100 millions euros for Wirtz besides his salary of 25 millions euros each year? How is the club suffering financially while three offers have been submitted to Stuttgart to buy Woltemade by around 60 millions euros? If the club is really trying to reduce wages why have they brought the 28 years old Luis Diaz at 70 millions euros with 14 millions euros as yearly salary instead of moving to the 20 years old Malick Fofana who costs 40 millions euros with a yearly salary that does not exceed few millions? Why was the 27 years flop Christopher Nkunku a target for a cost of at least 40 millions euros and a yearly salary of 14 millions euros and ignoring the U21 German international striker Nelson Weiper from FSV Mainz who has been one of the stars in the U21 UEFA Euro 2025, a potential future for Bayern after Harry Kane, with certainly much lower wages than Nkunku? Many and many other questions may be asked about this weird strategy adopted by the club to correct its financial status but questions have stopped here just for the sake of brevity.
5. Lack of long term plan and vision
Due to the overlap of opinions, conflicts of tasks and lack of clear hierarchy between the honorary president, the president, the CEO, the sporting director and the head coach, the club is seeming like a carriage pulled by many horses but each along its own direction instead of adding all efforts in parallel directions and same sense. Uli Höneß is getting older and older and is not anymore present in the daily football market, Herbert Hainer and Jan Christian Dreesen are not experts in technical and tactical sides of football. It is the role of the disappointing Max Eberl to expose in details to those aforementioned members, technically, tactically and financially his detailed plan and vision about the future squad of Bayern Munich: list of players that should be sold, the reasons behind this decision, the reduced wages that might result, the list of players that must come, the tactical and technical arguments behind bringing them, the costs to be paid, the impact of those players of the balance of the squad and how it will be able to compete with the other elite European clubs without forgetting youth academy players eligible to join the first team.
However, it seems that Eberl is not fulfilling all those tasks and is working very randomly on a deal here and a contract there. This is forcing Höneß, Hainer and Dreesen to intervene at some point trying to rectify things but being old and far from the modernity of the domain this is impacting negatively the team. One of the consequences: in the last five Champions League versions, Bayern has succeeded to reach the semi-finals only once (in 2024), while the quarter-final stage has been the last station in the four other attempts. As examples of poor squad construction:
(i) The giant Bayern Munich does not dispose a true right back player since Konrad Laimer is originally a defensive midfielder and Sasha Boey has not being convincing since his arrival and considered as flop signing.
(ii) Bayern Munich has surprisingly sold both potential talented back-ups of Alphonso Davies at the left back position: Frans Krätzig and Adam Aznu which has forced the coach Kompany to employ the center back Stanisic at this position due to Davies long injury
(iii) Bayern Munich has played the entire previous season without a real back-up for Harry Kane; this season they have just found a temporary solution by loaning Nicolas Jackson from Chelsea in the last minutes of the mercato instead of signing permanently a talented young striker, candidate of replacing Kane by next season since most probably he will leave the club, this means that: next summer, if Kane leaves and Jackson ends his loan period, Bayern must sign two strikers with high technical quality
(iv) the slow, hesitating and interrupted negotiations with Dayot Upamecano, one of the best 5 center backs worldwide actually; Upamecano is eligible to sign for any club in January 2026 and thus to leave Bayern as free agent in summer 2026.
Football fans who are really interested in pursuing this analysis, are invited to wait for part III that should come in the near future, hoping that the previous and present parts have been enjoyable and beneficial for them.
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